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 The Revolution and Industrial Workers:  
 the Disintegration and Reconstruction  
 of Socialism, 1953-1958 
 
 Mark Pittaway 
 
Just over three weeks after the arrival of Soviet troops in Budapest to 
remove the revolutionary government of Imre Nagy in November 1956, 
the party newspaper for the industrial county of Komárom-Esztergom, 
announced to local miners that “the workers’ councils (the 
revolutionary organs in the factories) had been given responsibility for 
the economic life of the country”. In negotiations with the new Soviet-
imposed government of János Kádár, the authorities signalled a 
willingness to make marked concessions the demands of miners, a key 
group within the workforce of the county. The “restoration of certain 
old privileges” like “the annual coal entitlement, rent-free 
accommodation and lighting, the re-integration of factories that had 
belonged to the mining enterprises with the mines” and “an expansion 
in family house-building” featured on the agenda of such discussions. 1 
Talk of such concessions occurred against the background of a miners’ 
strike that supported the political goals of the Revolution and which 
paralysed the Hungarian economy. In Tatabánya, the centre of the 
largest of the county’s two coal fields, the Revolution had been ignited 
by a combination of a sympathy strike of the city’s bus drivers with the 
demonstrators in Budapest and a major demonstration led by younger 
miners. While the local party in the city and the mines did not collapse 
to the same extent as in the rest of the country, the implosion of the 
regime at national level allowed the demonstrators to seize control of 
the mines locally, set up anti-communist workers’ councils, and 
effectively organize a strike in support of the political demands of the 
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Revolution. Though they returned to work for three days in early 
November, believing the political demands of the Revolution to have 
been accomplished, the Soviet invasion provoked a protracted miners’ 
strike, which dragged on for a full two months, causing coal shortages 
that closed schools and undermined medical services into early 1957. 2 
 
The targeted use of repression was at least as central to breaking the 
strike in the coal fields, as was the promise of concessions. Yet, 
repression often proved to be counter-productive; in Tatabánya the 
local police were forced to concede that the operations of the 
reconstructed state security agencies throughout December had not 
only provoked open demonstrations, but had in fact bolstered support 
for the strike. 3 Where local state security forces intervened to arrest the 
organizers of demonstrations and strikes it was forced to legitimate 
their actions. When in December, one attempt to arrest such organizers 
provoked an explosion of armed conflict in one of the city’s 
neighbourhoods, the party newspaper found it necessary to argue that 
the members of the new state security agencies were ordinary 
mineworkers dedicated to meet the demands of the “people” who 
“wanted to live in peace and quiet”. 4 As the post-revolutionary regime 
was consolidated, it was forced to build on the fiction that no “honest” 
worker had anything to fear from repression; only groups of “counter-
revolutionary” agitators. The myth, projected by the Kádár regime, of 
the events of late 1956 as a “counter-revolution”, in which anti-
socialist agitators, “reactionaries” and “agents of imperialism” had 
stirred up discontent in order to overthrow socialism, had its local 
counterpart. 5 In Tatabánya the overwhelmingly working-class 
character of the Revolution posed problems for the “revolutionary 
government of workers’ and peasants”. Therefore the local myth of the 
“counter-revolution”, underpinned by the most significant political 
trials, sought to attribute the events to the most anti-communist 
activists in the factories and more significantly to local professionals, 
who, despite holding key positions in the city’s revolutionary 
committee, were in reality either marginal or had been unable to control 
the consequences of the explosion of working-class anger. 6 
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While repression was far from successful as a tool for consolidating the 
regime, the wave of working-class anger was beaten back through other 
means. The fear, rather than the fact, of political retribution had 
encouraged many of those who joined the demonstrations in the city to 
leave Hungary outright. In Tatabánya’s Mine No. XI, at the end of 
January 1957, only 60 percent of those who had been employed there 
previous October continued to work there, some had left for other parts 
of the country, others had joined the flight from Hungary. 7 
Furthermore, forms of moral coercion deployed by the regime about the 
effects of shortages of coal, that were products of the miners’ strike, on 
schools, hospitals and the economy in general, proved highly effective 
in mobilizing those who remained. 8 These were often backed by more 
naked forms of blackmail – in December 1956 the county party paper 
warned that “if there is no coal, then Tatabánya’s food provision will 
be in danger”. 9 The failure of protest to remove the regime and 
intensifying economic hardship provided the central motivating factor 
for miners to go back to work. 10 Yet breaking the strike alone did not 
translate into support for the regime; a sullen mood in the mines in 
early 1957 masked a climate of deep-seated, but silent anger, which 
occasionally broke through, carried in rumours of imminent strikes and 
protest. 11 
 
The regime consolidated its authority in Tatabánya, and among the 
working class nationwide by following through promises of addressing 
directly the material grievances of workers. Most miners expected the 
re-imposition of socialist rule to lead directly to the return of despotic 
policies of plan-based mobilization in the workplace and those that had 
produced goods shortage and penury before the Revolution outside it. 
During the year following the Revolution the apparent openness of the 
party to working-class opinion in the city generated “surprise”. 12 
Measures like the large increases in wages, the initiation of a housing 
construction programme, and other welfare measures underpinned this 
at national level; while more locally unpopular systems of 
remuneration at the coalface were abolished, and certain benefits-in-
kind were restored. 13 Through such measures a year after the end of 
the strike, party officials were able to record, displaying some surprise, 
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a degree a cautious optimism; “it seems”, commented one, “that there 
is trust in the party and the government”. 14 This popularity was 
conditional and to some extent belied the fact that few accepted the 
official arguments about the nature of the Revolution, when questioned 
by propagandists about their attitudes to what had happened in 1956 
while miners began referring to it by calling it the “counter-revolution”, 
they often slipped into describing it “a revolution”. Most took the 
stance that “you should give us an honest wage, I’m not bothered with 
the rest.” 15  
 
The defeat of the Revolution and the consolidation of the Kádár regime 
in Tatabánya, as in other working-class communities across Hungary, 
presented an ambiguous picture of an event defeated through the highly 
selective, rather than the very widespread use of force. Moral and 
economic coercion played a larger role, upon which were laid 
substantial concessions in the workplace and the community. While 
this produced a degree of popularity and support for the Kádár regime 
by the end of 1957, this co-existed with profound awareness of its 
deeper illegitimacy, as a regime imposed through force-of-arms by the 
armies of a foreign power. This outcome points to the need to look at 
the 1956 Revolution in a new and different way. It was certainly not 
“the first domino”, which led irreversibly to the decay, decline and 
collapse of state socialism thirty-three years later as many have 
suggested. 16 While the revival of the memory of the 1956 Revolution 
played a fundamental role in the events of 1989 in Hungary, because of 
the way it symbolized the illegitimacy of the regime 17, in the short and 
medium-term it led to its consolidation; yet this consolidation occurred 
on the basis of a very different pattern of socialist governance to that 
which had characterised its rule during the early 1950s, and which drew 
lessons from the outbreak of the 1956 Revolution. 18 Given that the 
Kádár regime was a “post-1956” regime 19, it is not surprising that in 
its dynamic of construction, consolidation, decay and collapse it 
embodied many of the ambiguities that were visible during the 
outcome of the Revolution. 
 
The paradoxical co-existence of the stability of the Kádár regime with 
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perceptions of its deeper political illegitimacy was enabled , in part, by 
the fact that the Revolution and its outcome demonstrated definitively 
to Hungary’s anti-communist majority that the country’s post-war 
political order was not going to be dismantled either immediately, or 
easily. The collapse of the country’s pre-war regime, German 
occupation and then Soviet occupation at the end of the Second World 
War, created a society that was deeply divided. Fear of communist 
dictatorship among the conservative majority, and a parallel fear of the 
right among the left-wing minority polarized Hungarian society during 
the immediate post-war years, creating the social roots of eventual 
dictatorship. 20 On the political right, many believed in the inevitably of 
conflict among the wartime allies, and that only an effective 
demonstration of anti-Soviet sentiment in Hungary would bring 
military intervention from Britain and the United States, in the interests 
of “liberating” the territory from the clutches of the Red Army. During 
preparations for the first post-war elections in autumn 1945 in 
conservative regions like the north-western county of Győr-Moson 
local opinion held that if the country “votes for the Smallholders’ Party 
(the main party of the centre-right – M.P.) then the Soviets will leave 
the country, if they vote for the Communists they’ll stay forever.” 21 
With the creation of overt socialist dictatorship in the similarly 
conservative south-west of the country, growing political control led 
many to believe that the new socialist regime’s days were numbered, as 
it would be removed as the result of an imminent war between the 
superpowers. 22 As the dictatorship intensified its politics of 
confrontation and social transformation, especially through agricultural 
collectivization campaigns in rural areas, the belief in imminent 
western intervention to end socialist rule motivated explicit resistance. 
In villages on the north-western border in August 1950, smallholders 
refused to pay taxes or deliver foodstuffs to the authorities on the 
grounds that “the English were coming”. 23 These expectations of 
deliverance through foreign intervention encouraged many to interpret 
the aggressive propaganda of western radio stations and other 
propaganda actions, such as the balloon campaigns, launched by 
similar bodies, as a promise of “liberation”. 24 
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In this context the defeat of the Revolution and its failure to spark 
foreign military intervention against the Soviets produced a feeling of 
hopelessness and a gradual acceptance of the relative permanence of 
socialist regime. Belief in the imminence of foreign intervention was 
conspicuous in anti-regime rumour during 1957 by its absence. 25 The 
deep seated climate of resignation was expressed by an engineer in one 
Fejér county factory in March 1957; “only a third world war can help 
us, which will break out sooner or later; in the meantime it will be 
difficult, but afterwards the system will disappear.” 26 While one 
immediate popular response to this “culture of defeat” 27 among anti-
communists was to retreat into the domestic sphere, into alcoholism or 
religiosity 28, it laid the foundations for the tacit acceptance of the 
reality of Kádárism by many of its opponents, particularly its rural and 
urban middle-class ones, and thus, their integration into the system 
during the 1960s. 29 While the notion of the “culture of defeat” explains 
many of the paradoxes of the post-1956 period among those who 
always opposed Hungary’s post-war socialist order, as well as the 
behaviour of those left-wing intellectuals, who initially supported 
socialism, but turned to Imre Nagy and notions of a reformed socialism 
in the mid-1950s, it does not explain dominant working-class attitudes 
and patterns of behaviour. Hungary’s industrial workers were not 
homogeneous politically to be sure, but as the case of Tatabánya 
shows, their awareness of the illegitimacy of the Kádár regime, co-
existed with an extraordinary popularity among many that was gained 
at a very early date. By 1958, the government’s popularity was clearly 
discernible among workers in a number of different sectors and 
geographical locations. 30 This is especially surprising given the 
extensive participation of workers in the events of the Revolution. 
This, in turn, points to the need to consider the role of workers in the 
Revolution in greater depth, in order to explain their behaviour 
afterwards and thus tease out the nature of the relationship between the 
socialist state and working class in the Hungarian context. 
 
Despite the speedy consolidation of the Kádár regime in working-class 
communities, the party leadership remained deeply shocked at the 
extent of worker participation in and support for the Revolution. In 
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early 1957 party officials commented with dismay that among the 
thousands who left the western county of Győr-Moson-Sopron for 
Austria, there were many “workers from traditional working-class 
families”. 31  With the regime’s consolidation party officials 
underplayed the role and extent of working class discontent in the 
Revolution, arguing that the majority simply remained “passive” in the 
face of “counter-revolutionary” mobilization. This was because “the 
working class was primarily disappointed in the party leadership and 
did not see the party as the true representative of their class”. 32 The 
notion of industrial workers as “passive” during the Revolution was, 
however, a myth, but so too was the party’s collective notion of what 
constituted the “working class”. In general terms, the party’s use of the 
term “working class” tended to subsume all wage workers into an 
imaginary and homogeneous entity, which universally shared the 
values of those of the skilled, urban, male elite of the workforce who 
had supported the labour movement pre-1948. This underpinned 
notions - prevalent in the discussions among leading party officials 
after 1956 - of the “working class” as a social body that would act as 
the bulwark of the regime. 33 These were underpinned by a hegemonic 
discourse of the working class outside the party leadership that stressed 
the pre-eminence of the male, skilled elite and subordinated other more 
peripheral groups – this discourse of the working class had structured 
hierarchical relationships between workers in workplaces and 
communities since the end of the nineteenth century. It was embedded 
in the practice and common-sense of the labour movement, and came 
to represent a pattern of relationships and cultural practices that shaped 
the contours of working-class identity by the mid-twentieth century. 
 
The industrial and labour policies of Hungary’s socialist regime after 
1948, caused a fundamental breach between industrial workers and the 
“new” state. In the workplace the regime attacked the privileges of the 
skilled through the introduction of labour competition, new wage forms 
and different management structures. At the same time they expanded 
the workforce aiming to subvert the hierarchies of gender, generation 
and those based on distinctions between the urban and the rural. Their 
economic policies produced endemic income insecurity, widespread 
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penury and severe shortage, while they responded to the tensions these 
produced with repression. These policies caused the crumbling of 
working-class support for the regime during the early 1950s, but the 
patterns of relations in the workplace caused by the chaos produced by 
the state’s industrialization drive, allowed hierarchical relationships to 
reproduce themselves under new circumstances. Skilled workers, 
though profoundly alienated from the regime, continued to sit at the 
apex of modified hierarchical relationship in which greater numbers of 
working-class youth, women and those from rural areas were cast to a 
discontented periphery. 34 
 
Considerable working-class anger alone was insufficient to provoke 
widespread mobilization – between 1953 and 1956, the initiation of the 
“New Course” under the government of Imre Nagy, followed by ever 
more bitter struggles within the party, led to the fragmentation of the 
authority of the regime. These were met, in turn, by a greater 
expression of the considerable working-class discontent that persisted 
in Hungary’s factories, mines, and on its construction sites, that were 
never successfully alleviated by any of the protagonists in the struggle 
within the party. The onset of the revolutionary events in October 1956 
was met with a social explosion in which many working-class 
Hungarians, particularly those young workers cast to the periphery, 
provided the most militant sections of the working-class crowds which 
drove forward the Revolution in the country’s towns and cities. 
Different groups within the working class, especially the skilled, the 
young and rural workers, participated in the Revolution in highly 
distinctive ways. The re-construction the regime’s authority was 
underpinned by different processes within different groups but, given 
the cultural power, employed by older, urban, skilled male workers 
within hegemonic discourses of the working class, it was the regime’s 
ability to repair its relations with this group that was fundamental to the 
consolidation of its authority. 
 
The Politics of Gradual Collapse: From Reform to Rebellion, 1953-
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The spring and early summer of 1953 was a period of intense worker 
protest across East-Central Europe that demonstrated the tensions, 
which socialist rule had created. In May workers in the tobacco plant in 
Plovdiv in Bulgaria rioted as a result of unfavourable changes made to 
work norms. In Czechoslovakia a currency reform was introduced in 
the same month cutting into wages and eliminating savings, which 
resulted in generalised revolt in Plzeñ. In the German Democratic 
Republic decisions to tighten work norms led to a wave of 
demonstrations and strikes on 17th June 1953 across the country. 35 
Whilst the events in the GDR did not lead to open mass protest in 
Hungary, they had an electrifying effect in workplaces. The notion that 
a population could express its discontent openly in a socialist state 
began, albeit slowly, to lift the lid on a well of discontent. Industrial 
workers in Budapest stated openly that "the Hungarian party can learn 
from the German party that it is not correct to apply pressure all the 
time through the norms". In a neighboring factory one party member 
called for the smallholders to be given back land that had been 
"donated" to agricultural co-operatives. 36 
 
Against this background of growing social upheaval and under 
instruction from the Kremlin the Hungarian leadership modified their 
course. The country’s effective dictator, Mátyás Rákosi was forced to 
relinquish his position as Prime Minister, though not, crucially as 
secretary of the ruling party. His successor as head of government, Imre 
Nagy, launched a policy that suspended collectivization drives in rural 
areas and placed the problem of working-class material discontent at 
the centre of government action. 37 The announcement of the “New 
Course” led to both the growing public expression of working-class 
discontent 38, and official attempts through the press to address the 
neglect of workers’ “legitimate concerns” by the authorities in 
workplaces across the country. 39 More concretely it was met through a 
policy of concessions; the state moved to permit smallholders to leave 
agricultural co-operatives, fines and criminal penalties for work 
discipline infringements were revoked, an amnesty was granted to 
political prisoners, a higher priority was given to the implementation of 
protective legislation in the workplace, and wages were raised. 40 
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In terms of their impact on the working class “New Course” policies 
had two effects. On the one hand they failed to transform decisively the 
material conditions of industrial workers, except the skilled elites in 
some sectors. On the other, they strengthened many of the hierarchies 
that had reproduced themselves under the circumstances of the shortage 
economy of the early 1950s. This reinforcing of hierarchy was the 
product of the effects of different policies of different groups of 
workers, and these shaped the political attitudes of these groups 
towards Nagy’s reformist project. Among groups on the periphery of 
the workforce, Nagy’s project attained most popularity among anti-
communist rural workers. This was not due, however, to the program’s 
effect on industry, but on agriculture, as many felt the “New Course” 
heralded an end to agricultural collectivization. Some had greeted its 
announcement by attempting to quit their jobs and return to agriculture; 
at Mosonmagyaróvár’s aluminum smelter the 250 workers, who owned 
land, tried to quit the moment of the program was announced. Their 
attempts were blocked by the plant director. Though this resulted in an 
explosion of discontent, only 100 departed illegally. 41 As local party 
bodies and state authorities fought a rearguard action to prevent the 
dissolution of agricultural collectives and implemented more informal 
policies of administrative restriction against farmers 42, this illusion 
dissipated. Despite this, however, the post-1953 period was a relatively 
good one for many rural workers, especially for those who belonged to 
a household with a farm that could produce for the market, as the 
incomes of individual smallholders rose faster, albeit from a much 
lower base, than those of industrial workers. 43 Though such workers 
had never accepted the legitimacy of the socialist regime, favorable 
policies towards agriculture did allow Nagy to win a degree of personal 
popularity in the rural milieux in which such workers lived. In one 
village in western Hungary Nagy’s relaxation of the collectivization 
drive was compared to “the liberation of the serfs in 1848”. 44 Yet the 
rising incomes of some rural workers and continuing problems of food 
shortage in urban areas exacerbated the unpopularity of such workers, 
with many urban residents, especially in Budapest, who argued that the 
“New Course” was a “peasants’ policy” rather than a “workers’ policy” 
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– a sentiment which legitimized the casting of rural workers to the 
periphery of the workforce. 45 
 
The climate of the “New Course” reinforced the peripheral position of 
other groups within the workforce that had been generated by the 
reproduction of hierarchy within the working class during the early 
1950s. This was especially the case with women, where Nagy’s arrival 
in office accompanied attempts to implement protective legislation in 
the workplace, which it reinforced. This tended not to protect women 
in unhealthy and low-paying jobs in traditionally feminized sectors, but 
instead acted to remove women from those traditionally regarded as 
male, and high-paying, where they had gained a toe-hold as a 
consequence of the affirmative action campaigns of the early 1950s. 46 
Working-class youth, including young skilled workers, remained in a 
relatively marginal position in workplaces across the country. Their 
peripheral positions and consequent low wages led to considerable 
discontent that in turn drove many of them to seek better paid 
employment in neighboring establishments. 47 Placed in a peripheral 
position and deeply alienated, and often influenced by propaganda in 
western radio broadcasts many rejected the socialist system absolutely; 
in the Tatabánya mines one young miner urged a work-mate to “go to 
the West where at least you are valued for as long as you can work, 
here you are just treated like a dog to whom they occasionally throw a 
bone so you don't starve". 48 
 
The hardening of reproduced hierarchies in the workforce was driven, 
in part, because Nagy’s relaxation of despotic policies in the workplace 
had led to an intensification of informal bargaining that favored the 
older, male, skilled elite. Often sympathetic party members, union 
officials and lower-level managers had participated actively in opening 
the floodgates to a wave of bargaining in late 1953 that enshrined 
considerable informal control over remuneration by the skilled elite in 
everyday workplace practice. 49 Often, despite state intentions and 
although they often complained about their “inadequacy” 50, the wage 
increases mandated by the Nagy government in late 1953 further 
boosted the position of experienced skilled workers. 51 In some sectors, 
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especially coal mining the increases in skilled workers’ wages were 
substantial, as they were linked to a premium system, which ensured 
that when it was introduced in late 1953 face-workers’ wages increased 
by 22.3 percent in a two-month period, when production fell by 4 
percent. 52 Wage increases of this order generated a degree of 
satisfaction among miners, which went some way to defuse discontent. 
53
 
 
Yet, despite the reinforcement of their position within the workforce as 
a result of the policies of the Nagy government in the workplace, the 
skilled elite as a whole were far from satisfied – something that was in 
part a product of economic chaos during 1954, when shortages 
intensified and power-supply problems forced industry into short-time 
working during the winter months. 54 Yet, it was also fed by a 
perception that in a climate that was relatively permissive to agriculture 
and to trade, urban workers were losing ground in income and prestige; 
a sentiment that led them to eventually welcome Nagy’s dismissal in 
1955. 55 It would take Imre Nagy’s fall, and the policies pursued after 
his removal, to persuade the skilled elite of his merits. The turn away 
from reform, fronted by Nagy’s successor, András Hegedűs, installed 
by Rákosi, who at the helm of the party had never accepted the “New 
Course”, was prompted by the continuing economic chaos that gripped 
the country during 1954 and early 1955, and aimed to return to policies 
of renewed socialist industrialization and collectivization. Young 
workers, whose peripheral position had been barely touched under 
Nagy, remained profoundly antagonistic to the regime. Rural workers 
were infuriated by the renewed collectivization drives in rural areas, 
although anti-rural sentiment remained strong among their urban 
colleagues. 56 The skilled elite were confronted with the regime’s 
attempts to hold down the wage bill – their attempts to increase 
production norms in heavy industrial sectors and to limit the impact of 
the premium system in the coal mines, that had guaranteed higher 
wages provoked enormous opposition. This opposition was indeed 
greater in many factories than it had been to equivalent measures in the 
early 1950s – in some heavy engineering factories skilled workers were 
no longer frightened, and refused to work until the older, abolished 
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norms were re-instated. 57 The tightening of the premium system in the 
mines provoked a storm of complaints often supported by local unions 
and party cells. 58 
 
The pattern of reform, followed by clampdown, had antagonized most 
of the working class, and crucially its skilled elite. It also ensured that 
the experience of restrictive policies in 1955 created a popular hunger 
for further reform, in a context in which the authorities faced a 
workforce that would not be cowed as easily as it had been in the early 
1950s. 59 This provided an explosive social background for the crisis of 
the socialist regime during 1956.  The year of upheaval began in 
February with Nikita Khruschev's denunciation of Stalin, the purges 
and the cult of personality to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party. The speech had an electrifying effect in Hungary 60, 
as it weakened fatally the confidence of many working-class party 
members in the regime. When Khruschev's denunciation of Stalin was 
revealed to closed party meetings across the country, working-class 
Communists reacted with total incredulity. In Sztálinváros party 
members in the factories questioned the local leadership asking them: 
"Stalin led the party for thirty years, how can it be that his mistakes 
have been discovered now?" and "What is the current situation in 
Hungary with the cult of personality ? Was Rajk wrong ?", alongside 
more mundane questions: "I own a copy of Stalin's complete works and 
have read them all. What do I do with them now?" 61 In Budapest’s 
United Lighting and Electrics Factory the Khruschev speech soon 
became an open topic of conversation. Workers maintained that "the 
cult of personality was just as marked here (in Hungary) as in the 
Soviet Union, especially among the top leadership".62. 
 
As the year progressed, the growing militancy of the debates in the 
Petőfi kör, the intellectual debating forum of the opposition to Rákosi, 
especially its debate on press freedom increased the boldness of 
workers, especially those among the skilled elite, in expressing their 
views – it also underlined growing support for major political change 
among all sections of the working class. In the United Lighting and 
Electrics Factory, workers argued openly that "the leadership is 
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destroying the national economy. The people no longer believe 
anything they say and they have no role anymore". 63 The news of the 
riots in Poznań and the mounting political crisis in Poland contributed 
to the snowballing of politicized discontent among the skilled elite; for 
many "the riots broke out in Poznań not because of the enemy and 
foreign spies, but because twelve years after the end of the war living 
standards remained low". 64. As Rákosi was removed as party leader 
and replaced by Ernő Gerő in July, the loss of regime control became 
more obvious as did the spread of open popular opposition. Workers 
complained not about Rákosi's removal from power, but the method by 
which it was achieved, arguing that it demonstrated Hungary’s lack of 
national sovereignty. Furthermore there were growing signs of belief in 
the effectiveness of collective action; in the Ikarus bus plant it was 
argued that "under pressure from the masses the leadership has 
abolished the peace loans, if we exert even stronger pressure we will be 
able to force new measures to raise our living standards". 65 The effect 
of the combination of a loss of confidence within the party in its ability 
to govern and rising discontent was enormous; by September there was 
"a real feeling of panic" among members of the apparatus in Budapest. 
66
 
 
By summer 1956, the crumbling of the regime was met with greater 
political assertiveness from among the working class, particularly its 
urban, skilled, male elite. They were often supported by some factory 
and union committees who joined their rebellion. This climate was 
fuelled by an obviously worsening economic situation. In Budapest’s 
Duclós Mining Machinery Factory in August 1956 the factory party 
committee issued a statement demanding that "the rights of the workers 
be secured" in disputes with management; that workers were right "to 
demand a just wage system" and that the overly "formal monthly 
production meetings" be replaced with true forums of factory 
democracy. 67 More locally, within workplaces working-class anger 
was directed at the autocracy and arrogance of management, supported 
by the official functionaries of the party, union and youth organisation. 
In the Chinoin Pharmaceuticals Factory, skilled workers complained in 
spring 1956 that "the cult of personality manifests itself inside the 
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factory, particularly among the middle and upper level economic 
cadres. It has been common for workers not to criticize, or make 
suggestions just because they were scared of the management". 68 
Generalized rebellion among oil workers at the Lovászi Oil Drilling 
Plant in July 1956 was provoked by what workers saw as the 
“unjustified” payment of large plan fulfillment premiums to 
management, at a time when workers’ wages had fallen. Most 
complaints concerned low wages and social provision, the focus of 
their attack was on management. Károly Papp, the director of the plant, 
was attacked openly for promoting a "cult of personality" around 
himself, and using factory property to celebrate his birthday lavishly. 69 
 
As part of this wave of criticism, the skilled demanded greater 
democracy in the factories. One fitter in the Duclós Mining Machinery 
Factory complained in August that "it is useless complaining to the 
party and factory committee because they can't do anything. What 
happens here is basically what the director says". He saw the only 
remedy as being "to give the trade union a greater role". 70 By 
September the factory press began publishing similar complaints. One 
former trade unionist wrote in the paper of Budapest’s Danube Shoe 
Factory that "in the period following the liberation old, committed 
trade unionists were promoted to become managers. We should say 
clearly that later these comrades became detached from the workers, 
they became one sided and didn't speak up sufficiently for their 
interests ..... new people filled the trade union and the beginnings of the 
co-option, not the elections of the (new) leaders (of the unions) began 
..... the union leaders regarded anyone who stood up for their interests 
as the enemy, and dealt with them in this manner". 71 Yet as the mood 
for change in workplaces gathered pace, the regime was close to 
collapse. The growing thaw in relations with Yugoslavia, the re-burial 
of László Rajk on the 6th October, the retention of power by Gerő, 
discredited by his Stalinist past, and the lack of any clear leadership 
from the regime pushed the situation to crisis point. When the 
Revolution began on the 23rd October, with student demonstrations in 
Budapest, industrial workers would play more radical roles than they 
had done beforehand. 
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The Power of the Working-Class Crowd: October-November, 1956 
 
In the prison camp attached to Mine No. XVIII in the geographically 
isolated, western Hungarian mining town of Oroszlány, many of the 
prisoners, who worked in the mines under sentence, concluded in mid-
October that “they wouldn’t be shut inside for much longer”. As 
students prepared to demonstrate in Budapest to secure political 
change, at noon on 23rd October the prisoners attempted to overpower 
the guards at the mine entrance and break out. The factory guard was 
only able to restore order by firing on the prisoners, killing three. When 
three days later, the local Revolution was launched by a crowd of 
around 500 young workers, who marched through the town shouting 
“Work! Bread! Rákosi to the Gallows! (Munkát! Kenyeret, Rákosinak 
kötelet)”, they were motivated as much by solidarity with the prisoners 
as with demonstrators in Budapest. After the leaders of the 
demonstration delivered their demands to the local radio station, 
around 150 proceeded to Mine No. XVII where they freed the 
prisoners, after the guard refused to fire on the demonstrators. 72 
 
While much of the historiography of the revolution has tended to see 
revolutionary mobilization as being sparked by the events in Budapest 
on 23rd October, the opening of the archives and research into the 
“local revolutions” has qualified this Budapest-centered account, 
unveiling evidence of much unrest, just as in Oroszlány, that took place 
before or as the events in Budapest got underway.73 Student 
mobilization in provincial centers such as Debrecen, Miskolc and 
Szeged was marked, while the authorities were made aware of the 
simmering discontent and strained patience of industrial workers in 
their cities. 74 Even where the explosion of Revolution occurred in 
response to the events in Budapest, as in many of the capital’s working-
class suburbs, or in Tatabánya as was discussed above, the signs of 
political mobilization were present prior to the 23rd October, while 
local events themselves were driven by dynamics particular to their 
location. 75 
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The Revolution, right across the country, involved a rapid re-location 
of political power from the party and regime to the revolutionary 
crowd, which during the last week of October and the first days of 
November acted as the locus of political legitimacy. In cities across the 
country, the crowd, organized through initially peaceful 
demonstrations, assumed the role as the representative of the “will of 
the people”, demanding a change in the political order. 76 Crowds 
played a central role in the “cleansing” of public space, through the 
deliberate and at times, almost theatrical removal of monuments and 
artifacts associated with either the Red Army or the socialist regime. 77 
The frequent incidents where representatives of either the army or state 
security services fired on initially non-violent crowds after 23rd 
October, both radicalized the revolution and underlined the illegitimacy 
of the regime. 78 Such acts of violence against revolutionary crowds 
bolstered their claim to act in the name of the people as a whole. 
Furthermore, they could and frequently did confer their legitimacy on 
revolutionary organs set up during the Revolution, while they played a 
role in supervising the actions of other organs that displayed an 
ambiguous attitude towards the will of the revolutionary crowd. 79 
 
Though the revolutionary crowd appeared as the unified embodiment 
of the will of the nation, the crowds were far from homogeneous either 
politically or socially. In many towns, like Zalaegerszeg, secondary 
school students and industrial workers provided the core of the 
demonstrations that ignited local revolutions, which attracted members 
of other occupational groups to join vocal demands for change. 80 
Workers played a central role in the demonstrations in urban centers 
right across the country, and often were over-represented among the 
dead and injured when crowds were fired upon; of those killed when 
the state security agencies fired on demonstrators in Mosonmagyaróvár 
on 26 October workers made up 65.15 percent. 81 Workers were not the 
only people in the revolutionary crowds, though they played a crucial 
role in many, but the different groups within the workforce played very 
different roles either within the crowd; had very different relationships 
to the crowd; or, participated in crowds in different locations from 
many of their workmates. Working-class youth were the most radical 
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group in that they drove political change, and were most likely to 
participate in armed groups during the Revolution. The skilled were the 
most split politically and participated most actively in the struggles for 
control of the factories, while rural workers tended to return to spread 
the Revolution to their villages, and largely sought the reversal of 
agricultural collectivization. 
 
The role of young workers in providing a group of militants who were 
prepared to drive forward the Revolution was fundamental. In 
Budapest, younger workers were frequently drawn to the initial 
demonstrations; played a central role in radicalizing those 
demonstrations, and then in spreading disturbances back to the 
industrial suburbs. One second-year industrial apprentice in the United 
Lighting and Electrics Factory, I.M., was working on 23 October when 
“I heard that there was a demonstration in Budapest in Stalin square”. 
Immediately catching the tram and trolleybus into central Pest he was 
forced to get off some way short of the square, because “the crowd was 
so big, that the trolleybuses stood in a jam and everyone went on foot.” 
82
 Often youth participation in the early stages of the Revolution 
resembled lower-level and less political forms of youth disorder in 
industrial communities. 83 One group of young working-class males on 
hearing of demonstration determined to go to the hostel for local 
student nurses, and “take the girls off to the demonstration” in 
Budapest. Once they discovered that the director of hostel had locked 
the inhabitants in, they began to shout “Russians Go home, Rákosi to 
the gallows” until the police arrived. 84 
 
Outside the capital, young workers played a central role in the first 
demonstrations in many communities. In Tatabánya, while striking 
local bus drivers provided the catalyst for the local revolution, they 
joined younger workers in seeking to transform their strike into an 
occupation of public space, as apprentices from the mining technical 
school and young miners from the workers’ hostels provided the core 
of initial demonstrations. The spontaneity of the demonstrations was 
demonstrated by the confusion of different slogans – some shouted the 
old, socialist slogan of “bread! work!”, while others sang the himnusz – 
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Hungary’s national anthem – as they marched. 85 As the number of 
participants in the demonstrations increased, young workers took key 
roles in the “cleansing” of public space of monuments associated with 
either the Soviets or the socialist regime; in Nagykanizsa, those who 
pulled down the Soviet war memorial in the town were led by a twenty-
six year old worker, whose working life had been filled through a series 
of jobs in the mining and construction sectors. 86 The activities of 
working-class youth extended not merely to violence against the 
symbols of the socialist regime, but they played a direct role in violence 
against those they perceived to be representatives of the regime. They 
frequently acted as the “agents” of the revolutionary crowd in carrying 
out demands for removing Communists from the head of public 
institutions. In Újpest’s Danube Shoe Factory, the belief of the crowd 
that “the workers’ council was in the hands of the Communist 
director”, led to four armed young workers, led by the son of one 
factory employee, deciding they would storm the factory and “arrest” 
the director, as part of a process through which the workers’ council 
would be purged. 87 
 
The issue of violence raises the question of the process by which 
working-class youths within demonstrations armed themselves and 
formed themselves into armed groups. The boundaries between these 
armed groups of young workers and the informally-organized “national 
guards”, that nominally served local revolutionary committees 
answerable to the crowd was a fluid one. In Tatabánya, a small section 
of the official demonstration successfully laid siege to the local police 
station freeing prisoners and gaining access to weapons. These were 
supplemented by those given to them after laying siege to a local army 
barracks. While some of the radical, armed demonstrations went to join 
the “fight” in the capital, a core of around thirty remained to form a 
“national guard” detachment, to guarantee the local revolution. 88  In 
Budapest, where peaceful demonstrations were fired upon, and with the 
subsequent intervention of Soviet troops, young workers who had 
joined the demonstrations moved to arm themselves, by demanding the 
weapons that were stored in factories for civil defense purposes. During 
the early hours of 24th October, young workers joined other 
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demonstrators in raiding factories for weapons – not all were 
undefended; in some, remembered one young worker “the porter on the 
door was already armed with a machine gun”. 89 In some factories, 
armed bands made up of young workers, and factory security guards 
engaged in gun battles at factory gates; in some cases, workers 
reporting for the morning shift were caught and injured in the cross-
fire, though in the vast majority of cases the authorities were able to 
repel these attacks. 90 
 
The attempts of the authorities to retain control over both factories, and 
more broadly, working-class communities foundered on the breadth of 
support among workers for the overthrow of the regime; even though 
many workers were less radical than their younger workmates. In 
factories in Budapest suburbs like Újpest, the student demonstrations 
provoked considerable sympathy among workers on 23rd October; in 
one meeting in the Chinoin Pharmaceuticals Factory “a university 
student spoke and read out their demands expressed as a series of 
points …. some of the points were met with enthusiastic applause”. 91 
On the morning of the same day the “sixteen points” – the demands of 
the Budapest student demonstrators 92 - were circulated among the 
workers of the neighboring United Lighting and Electrics factory, 
where they had “a considerable impact”. 93 In the Chinoin the mood 
had only been defused by the director urging workers to “await the 
view of the party of the demonstration”. 94 The denunciation of the 
demonstrators as “counter-revolutionaries” by Ernő Gerő in his radio 
broadcast, the consequent demonstrations in front of the headquarters 
of national radio and the firing on crowds by the state security services 
there, followed by the news of the intervention of Red Army troops 
overnight turned the mood in the capital’s industrial suburbs into one 
of fury. In the United Lighting and Electrics factory the following 
morning two-thirds of the workers arrived at work, but during the 
morning the skilled workers in the tool workshop and in the vacuum 
plant stopped work to organize a mass meeting of all workers that 
launched the strike and decided to remove the red star from above the 
factory gate. 95 With the spread of the strike a large number of workers 
took to the streets to demand political change; over the course of the 
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morning there “were many people in front of the State Department 
store, and leaflets were distributed from a black car. They shouted and 
told me that we were all on strike”. 96 The crowd destroyed the Soviet 
war memorial; its more radical wing turned on the local police station, 
yet a majority remained at the site of the war memorial and as a result 
of local activists addressing the crowd they chose a body of people to 
represent them and thus take over public administration. Thus the 
crowd delegated a local “revolutionary committee” through chaotic 
acclamation, rather than election as such. 97 
 
The dynamic of a strike in support of the Revolution, providing the 
spark for the creation of the working-class crowd through 
demonstrations was one which was replicated in other industrial areas 
across the country. In Nagykanizsa, the work stoppage began in the 
Transdanubian Oil Mining Machinery Factory where strikers called for 
support “for Budapest University students”, on the “Russians to go 
home”, “the introduction of a multi-party system”, “the removal of 
Communist leaders and managers”, “withdrawal from the Warsaw 
Pact” and “the removal of the Gerő government”. 98 Joined by workers 
from other workplaces and carrying national flags the demonstrators 
removed the emblems of the peoples’ republic from public buildings as 
they passed, converging on and demolishing the town’s Soviet war 
memorial. 99 The “election” of revolutionary organs was conducted 
under the same kind of chaotic circumstances as with the revolutionary 
committee in Újpest; though the election of the revolutionary organ in 
Tatabánya was to be conducted by a meeting of representatives of the 
city’s factories and mines, it was chosen in confused circumstances and 
effectively drew its legitimacy from the fact that it represented the 
crowd that had assembled in the city the previous day. 100 
 
The confusion in which revolutionary organs were created to oversee 
local public administration, and their problematic role given that their 
legitimacy was located in the revolutionary crowd, was replicated 
inside enterprises. As many striking workers left to take to the streets; 
new organs inside workplaces – the workers’ councils – were created. 
Their ambiguous position was not only generated, as the example of 
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the machine plant of Tatabánya’s Coal Mining Trust shows, by the 
chaos in which they were created, but also by the fact that they could be 
used by local Communist cells as part of an attempt to maintain control 
of their enterprises. The election in this plant took a disorganized form: 
“they shouted out names, and the workers replied whether they agreed 
to their election or not. The first to be elected was L.I., the party 
secretary, then me, then F., and then the others”. 101 The first workers’ 
council in an enterprise, that of Újpest’s United Lighting and Electrics 
Factory, was organized by the factory party committee, precisely with 
the intention of ensuring that “trustworthy people would be elected”. 
This attempt was unsuccessful. 102 Before revolution convulsed the 
whole country, the creation of workers’ councils had been endorsed as 
a strategy by both the party and the official trade unions as means of 
controlling the economy in the circumstances of outright revolution. 103 
In the Gheorgiu-Dej Shipyards the plant’s party organization used its 
workers’ council as cover to prevent local revolutionary activists 
empowered by the territorial revolutionary committee from gaining 
access to the site. 104 
 
Even among the workers’ councils where the party’s attempts to 
influence the elections had foundered, and a coalition of skilled 
workers and engineers was able to take control, the councils were less 
radical than those elected on the streets – at least until the very end of 
October. In the forty-eight hours that followed the election of the 
United Electrics Workers’ Council, it re-made the institutions of the 
factory. The factory's managing director and one production director 
were removed; the managing director was replaced with the president 
of the worker's council. It announced that it saw itself as provisional, 
existing only until full elections could be held. It abolished the 
Personnel Department which under Rákosi had been used as the 
representative of both the party and the secret police within the 
management of the factory. It further announced that the strike would 
be maintained and full wages would be paid, whilst low paid workers 
would be given a 15% wage rise and other workers 10%. It began the 
process moreover of more fundamental reforms to factory 
administration, beginning administrative de-centralisation and the 
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elimination of bureaucracy, an overhaul of the payment-by-results 
wage system in the factory, and called for the establishment of a 71 
member general workers' council and for the creation of shop workers’ 
councils under it. 105 The skilled worker majority whose thinking 
dominated the changes instituted by the workers' councils made their 
philosophy and distrust of centralization clear at a meeting of all the 
councils in Újpest on 29th October; "the mistakes of recent years show 
that we have to build from below, we have to solve problems using our 
own strength". Yet, they also underlined their distrust of the radicalism 
of bodies like the territorial revolutionary committee in Újpest that 
drew their legitimacy from the crowd; “it seems that the power that has 
been paid in the blood of our young people is falling into the hands of 
different, fractious elements”. 106 
 
The skilled elite that dominated the early workers’ councils built on the 
calls for factory democracy that preceded the Revolution, forcing 
radical transformation of structures of management and working 
conditions. But politically they tended to be more moderate than much 
of the crowd; in the words of the newspaper of the workers’ council of 
the Ganz Wagon and Machine Factory “with the help of Imre Nagy, we 
have already been able to start out on a road that will bring about the 
realization of our other demands …. But …. we aren’t going to demand 
the immediate implementation of demands for which time is needed”. 
107
 This stance, coupled with the knowledge that many Communists 
continued to participate in workers’ councils, brought them into 
conflict with the revolutionary crowd and its delegated representatives. 
Distrust could deteriorate into conflict; on 29th October an incorrect 
statement on national radio that 1,500 workers reported for work at the 
United Lighting and Electrics provoked demonstrations against the 
workers’ council, whom they accused of sabotaging the Revolution, 
despite the fact that the workers’ council stated clearly that it “will not 
re-start work, until Soviet troops leave the country”. 108 The failure to 
pay wages to strikers at the neighboring Duclós Mining Machinery 
plant provoked similar demonstrations at the factory gates 109, 
provoking complaints from the more radical workers in the crowd that 
this was because there were many “who did not represent the workers’ 
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interests” on the workers’ council, leading to demands it be purged of 
Communists. 110 The growing radicalization of the crowd, and the 
consolidation of the authority of territorial revolutionary committees, 
restricted the room for maneuver of many of the workers’ councils, 
especially those which were more weakly led. In Újpest, largely against 
the will of many of the workers’ councils, especially that of the United 
Lighting and Electrics, the local revolutionary committee decided that 
all the districts’ workers’ councils were “provisional”, and that 
“persons who had been functionaries could not be elected”. 111 
 
In many of the workers’ councils the removal of former Communist 
functionaries provoked a marked radicalization of their policies. In the 
Chinoin Pharmaceuticals Plant, the Újpest revolutionary committee 
succeeded in re-constituting the workers’ council. The Revolution 
inside the factory was instantly radicalized, moving further politically 
than earlier workers’ councils, by banning Communists from 
organizing but allowing the newly re-founded Smallholders’ Party to 
set up a work-based cell, and forcing the director to resign after he 
refused to renounce Communism. 112 Workers’ councils set up at the 
end of October, and which were constituted in workplaces where the 
influence of skilled workers and a labor movement tradition was 
weaker tended to be more radical from their foundation. At the 
Nagylengyel Oil Drilling Plant, a workplace that was relatively new 
and located in a rural area, the formation of the workers’ council took a 
very different direction to that in Budapest. On 28th October, the local 
official union organization attempted to call workers together to elect a 
workers’ council – when the head of factory-level union began his 
speech by addressing the assembled workers as “Comrades!”, he was 
shouted down by workers who responded with “your time is up!”. An 
anti-communist workers’ council was elected as a result of the meeting, 
whose president proclaimed that “the time of the Stalinists is over; we 
have to wipe them out”. The mass meeting sacked most of the 
management, and crucially those responsible for setting norms. 113 
 
While the democratic socialist vision of the urban, skilled elite that was 
implicit in the early workers’ councils was eclipsed by the growing 
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radicalism of crowds, and was largely absent in workplaces in which 
this group was less well-represented, worker-peasants focused rather on 
joining a rural revolution directed against agricultural collectivization. 
Among Komló’s miners there were many who “regularly went home 
for the weekend. So when the real Revolution came and the work was 
stopped, most of the people went home and did not return to Komló for 
several weeks.” 114 While long-distance commuters melted away 
returning to their home villages, in areas where there was substantial 
commuting from villages to industrial establishments on a daily basis, 
the Revolution in urban, working-class communities ignited 
Revolution in rural areas. In the village of Várgesztes, on the fringes of 
the Tata coalfield, all but 6 of the 97 households had members working 
outside agriculture in 1956, virtually all in mining. News of 
revolutionary events in neighbouring Oroszlány fed growing anger in 
the village that, in turn led to the overthrow of the local council, and its 
replacement by a national committee elected by the crowd. 115 In rural 
areas, the largest local industrial enterprise and its worker-peasant 
workforce played a crucial role in spreading revolution to the villages. 
In Bázakerretye after demonstrators destroyed the Soviet war 
memorial, worker-peasants commandeered the trucks owned by the 
local oil drilling plant and used it to spread the revolution to their home 
villages, where they proclaimed that “there has already been a 
demonstration in Bázakerretye, it is time to burn the portraits of Stalin 
and Rákosi, and all red flags too”. 116 
 
In rural communities dominated by worker-peasants, issues of 
agricultural land ownership figured prominently, together with 
demands for Soviet withdrawal and anti-communism. Worker-peasants 
were as likely to join the anti-collectivization revolt as were other 
village dwellers; in the mining village of Vértesszöllős, next to 
Tatabánya, demonstrators demanded the break-up of the local 
collective farm and the return of land to its previous owners. 117 In 
Dömeföld, in the far south-west, the degree to which anger, even 
among rural dwellers with jobs in industry or mining was directed 
against those responsible for implementing the regime’s agrarian 
policies was underlined. The first acts of the worker-peasant 
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revolutionaries were to break into the offices of the village council and 
burn the paperwork connected with the local collective and the taxation 
of local farmers. 118 In nearby Becsehely, worker-peasants joined with 
individual landholders, in demonstrations against the local collective 
farm, demanding its dissolution and the distribution of its property, 
though failed to achieve their goal in the face of resistance from the 
members of the collective. 119 
 
The Fragmentation of Resistance and the Dynamics of Post-
Revolutionary Consolidation, November 1956-June 1958 
 
During his trial for “participation in a movement that aimed at the 
overthrow of the peoples’ democratic order” in September 1957, Imre 
Kovács, who had led the anti-communist workers’ council in the 
Tatabánya Mining Enterprise machine plant during the strike that 
followed Soviet intervention in November 1956, defended himself in 
part by denying his anti-Soviet stance. Yet, he also did so, by arguing 
that the demands of revolutionary bodies in Tatabánya that he had 
supported had “been largely met by the Kádár government” since the 
Revolution. 120 In making this rather strange defence, Kovács put his 
finger on the split opinion of many urban, and especially skilled 
workers of the government that the Red Army had brought to power; 
they felt, on the one hand, that many of their material aspirations were 
met, though they still continued to be fearful and mistrustful of the 
regime that ruled them. In the Domestic Worsted Mill in the capital, 
most workers in June 1958 spoke of the poor economic situation 
“before 1956”, and the better one “after 1956”, arguing that “the 
counter-revolution played a definite role in the improvement of the 
situation”. 121 The deep-seated distrust of the regime, and perceptions 
of its illegitimacy were revealed in the working-class reactions to the 
execution of Imre Nagy in the same month. In the Csepel Works, many 
compared it openly to the show trial conducted against László Rajk in 
1949 and wondered how long it would take the party to “re-habilitate” 
him. Others argued that “Imre Nagy died a freedom-fighter”, while 
some maintained that “had the trial not been held in secret, then Imre 
Nagy’s supporters would have hindered his execution”. 122  
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Yet this split opinion did not emerge overnight with Soviet 
intervention, nor was it shared by all workers, but emerged slowly over 
the course of the eighteen months that followed the arrival of Soviet 
tanks in many industrial communities in the days following their attack 
on Budapest on 4th November 1956. Their overthrow of Imre Nagy and 
attempt to replace him with Kádár was initially met with the same kind 
of explosion of working-class anger that had ignited the Revolution 
twelve days before. In Tatabánya’s new town, remembered one local 
journalist, “there was a large telegraph pole with a loudspeaker, which 
carried the news from the miners’ radio; one evening – Wednesday 7th 
November – they announced that the city’s Soviet commander was 
speaking to the city’s population. The crowd, with their bare hands, 
brought down the pole, broke it completely, and smashed up the 
loudspeaker when it crashed to the ground”. 123 One other local miner 
spoke of the “blind rage” which greeted Soviet intervention and fuelled 
the strike. “Everyone was stunned that their independence, their 
neutrality was over”, he remembered, “the people were most happy 
about neutrality …. There was Austria as an example, because they 
were neutral. The Russians went, they became neutral, and their living 
standards just went up …. Because of that neutrality was very 
important”. 124 
 
The motivations of working-class crowds were complex, but behind the 
political demands lay deep seated fury at the material poverty 
experienced by many workers under Rákosi. The role of penury in 
fuelling political protest presented the regime with both a problem and 
an opportunity. It offered the difficulty that without addressing material 
grievances successfully it would be unable to consolidate its authority; 
but it offered them a possibility, that if they succeeded in offering 
material improvement, combined with selective repression, they could 
encourage enough of the working class to forget their political demands 
and aspirations and accommodate to the situation. Yet, workers were 
also far from united about the extent to which they accommodated to 
the new regime, or, indeed, resisted it. 
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Armed resistance on the streets, in which working-class youth were 
over-represented was was effectively smashed within days of the Soviet 
intervention. The armed guerrilla groups in the capital continued to 
resist before they were overwhelmed by superior Soviet firepower on 
the 8th November. 125 In Csepel armed resistance lasted for a further 
three days, falling to the Soviets on the 11th November. 126  It is very 
difficult to estimate the total casualties of the street fighting; official 
statistics that almost certainly underestimate the number of casualties 
give an indication. They show that in Budapest some 16,700 were 
injured and 2,502 were killed. Of those killed, a majority were under 
thirty and were industrial workers.  127 In the provinces resistance was 
more sporadic; in Tatabánya news of the Soviet intervention was 
greeted with anger, though many believed that armed resistance would 
be futile and the revolutionary bodies resisted calls to arm angry youths 
with petrol bombs to stop the advance into the town. 128 In Sztálinváros 
this was not the case; as news of the Soviet intervention spread "at least 
80 percent of the male residents" prepared to fight Soviet tanks with 
petrol bombs. Aware of the preparations being made, the Soviets held 
back until the 7th November attacking the town initially by air and then 
by land. In the ensuing battle eight were killed and thirty-five wounded 
before the town was overrun 129.  
 
In the factories the immediate reaction to the news of the Soviet 
intervention was one of furious shock. The result was an immediate 
and solid strike against the new government and its Soviet patrons. In 
the capital this strike remained solid for up to a week. In the United 
Lighting and Electrics Factory, the moderate workers’ council backed 
the strike, not allowing workers into the factory until the 12th 
November. Even then due to reduced electricity supplies work was 
unable to start, while the workforce remained deeply distrustful and 
fearful. 130 More generally in Újpest "a mood behind the strike" 
remained 131, while the radical territorial Revolutionary Committee 
struggled to master a situation over which, following the Soviet 
intervention, they had no real control. With the drift back to work they 
attempted to seize the initiative. Renaming themselves the Újpest 
Revolutionary Workers’ Council, they threw down a challenge to the 
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Kádár government. Proclaiming that “every worker in Budapest wants 
to see order in the capital. Of course we do not wish to see any sort of 
order, but revolutionary order, one which is based on the realization of 
the demands of the Revolution”. In order to achieve this aim they 
invited representatives of all factories in the capital to Újpest’s town 
hall, in order to found a Budapest workers’ council. 132 
 
In response to the move the Kádár government and its Soviet allies 
adopted a two track strategy. It issued a decree allowing the workers to 
elect legal Workers' Councils within three weeks of returning to work. 
133
 At the same time they attempted to prevent the Újpest meeting 
taking place. Soviet tanks surrounded the town hall and the members of 
the Újpest Revolutionary Workers' Council were arrested. 134 The 
meeting was postponed and held the next day under the auspices of the 
more moderate United Lighting and Electrics Workers' Council, which 
established the Budapest Central Workers' Council. The new council 
was split between relative moderates, who argued for a political 
compromise with the Kádár regime, and members of anti-communist 
workers’ councils who demanded that the Soviet-imposed government 
not be recognized.. The workers' representatives were much more 
militant, and it was only one of them, Sándor Báli from the Workers' 
Council of the Standard factory who gave the new body a clear 
strategy; to refrain from recognising the Kádár government but to 
negotiate with it. 135 The new council called for the introduction of a 
mutli-party system, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and 
greater democracy in the Hungarian workplace. It negotiated with the 
government, though relations between the Workers' Council and the 
state were tense and by the beginning of December agreement seemed 
to be highly unlikely. Furthermore, it continued to be dogged by splits 
between moderates and radical anti-communists over both strategy and 
tactics. 136 
 
At the same time that it became clear there was no basis for agreement 
between the council and the government, the body was becoming a de-
facto national workers’ council, and thus a focus of opposition to the 
Kádár government.137 Taking these factors into consideration Kádár 
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shifted from a policy of negotiation to one of repression. On 5th 
December some two hundred activists in the workers' council 
movement and the former intellectual opposition were arrested. This 
and the active prevention of plans to call a meeting to found a National 
Workers' Council and growing government intransigence led to a 
serious stand-off between the Budapest Central Workers' Council and 
the state. The Council called for a two day general strike on the 11th 
and 12th December and was immediately outlawed. Its members were 
gradually arrested over the next few days and by the morning of the 
11th with the arrest of the two leaders of the council, Sándor Rácz and 
Sándor Báli, the government succeeded in effectively eliminating its 
most dangerous adversary. 138 Following the removal of the Greater 
Budapest Central Workers' Council state policy moved to one of 
explicit repression. Fear of retribution created a situation in which 
factory-level workers’ councils refused to heed the strike call on 11th 
December, though much of the workforce did. Arrests of workers' 
council members continued throughout December. 139 On the 13th 
December the government banned strikes and demonstrations, a 
position that was to be strengthened in January 1957 when the 
government decreed that striking or incitement to strike be made a 
capital offence 140. 
 
Yet Kádár’s turn to repression was informed by a knowledge that by 
early December industrial workers were becoming ever more weary of 
strike action, in part because they came to see the eventual victory of 
Kádár as inevitable, but largely because of the effect of the collapsing 
economy on their incomes and the food supply situation. The Budapest 
party committee noted that "in the first half of November at a decision 
of the Workers' Council without any sign of resistance the factories 
would stop" yet "by the second half of November they (the Workers' 
Councils) tried to find better justifications for work stoppages: wage 
demands, solidarity, strike" yet even at this stage "the desire to work is 
growing". 141 On the first day of the forty-eight hour general strike – the 
11th December – in Újpest in most of the factories no work was done. 
In the Magyar Pamutipar cotton factory, however, work began as 
normal on the morning shift and only when the news of the arrests of 
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the leaders of the Greater Budapest Central Workers' Council arrived, 
did workers walk out. Despite this on the 13th the Workers' Council in 
the plant vowed that it would re-start production and take greater care 
over the maintenance of work discipline. By this point, however, it was 
not merely a recognition of the defeat of the Revolution or growing fear 
of police retribution that was deterring workers from resorting to the 
strike weapon, but the growing fear of unemployment given the crisis 
ridden state of the economy and the lack of strike pay. 142 
 
Despite the gradual breaking of the strike, and the elimination of 
revolutionary organs in cities and villages alike, the situation in 
industrial communities remained tense well into 1957. Many younger 
workers had fled the country, while worker-peasants remained in their 
villages for months afterwards. Among urban and skilled workers a 
culture of protest simmered. During the early part of the year anti-
regime leaflets were still being circulated throughout the United 
Lighting and Electrics. One leaflet stated that "Kádár still keeps the 
Rákosite Antal Apró, out with the swindler Márosan, bring Imre Nagy 
into the government, out with the Soviet Army, declare Hungarian 
neutrality, why is the Kádár government scared of arming the peasants 
and workers ? Perhaps they are fascists". 143 On the national holiday of 
15th March anti-government leaflets circulated in the Stalin Steel 
Works. 144 On the first anniversary of the outbreak of the Revolution, 
23rd October 1957, rumors - "they are striking in Csepel", or "in Újpest 
there were demonstrations" - were widespread. 145 In the United 
Lighting and Electrics some of the workers engaged in a deliberate act 
of sabotage to commemorate the Revolution by destroying the 
electrical box that supplied power to light the red star on the front of 
the building, thus ensuring that during the week following the 23rd 
October it did not light up. 146 
 
Yet, during the first half of 1957, what was marked, was the way in 
which even urban workers underlined their distrust of the government, 
through support for cultural practices and institutions associated with 
anti-communism, even though they had not done so in the Rákosi 
years. One of the concrete manifestations of this was the growth of 
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popular religious observance following the suppression of the 
Revolution. In the capital in 1957 the population was considerably 
more assertive about its perceived right to celebrate Christmas than it 
had been in previous years. For midnight mass and for the Christmas 
day services the churches in many "working class" districts of the 
capital were full, according to one party official "there hasn't been such 
attendance (at church) for years". 147 In contrast to the pre-Revolution 
years when church congregations in the capital had been made up of 
elderly women, during Christmas 1957 in one industrial district 25 to 
30 percent of the congregations were aged between 18 and 20. In 
another similar district some 60% of those attending the Christmas 
morning service were male manual workers. During 1958 it was 
noticed that a significant minority of manual workers in one district 
spent ten minutes in their local church before and after work each day. 
Furthermore in schools in the same districts some the parents of 38% of 
children from worker households opted for religious education. 148 
 
This was combined with a retreat from the public realm entirely, which 
was especially marked among the young, and among worker-peasants. 
Alienation from official political activity could be seen among younger 
workers who tended to develop more individualistic and exclusively 
material aspirations. One young female commuter who worked in the 
Zalaegerszeg Clothing Factory illustrated the attitudes of this group. 
She was described as "exhibiting passivity" as far as political questions 
were concerned, and refused to participate in any political organization 
established in the factory, and her sole ambition was reported to be 
becoming a skilled worker. 149 These attitudes fed through to the newer 
skilled workers; another party brigade that spoke to three newly trained 
skilled workers in 1958 found them uninterested and uninformed about 
politics at all. In many cases interest in things material was strong. 150 
Furthermore one other symptom of withdrawal from the public realm 
after 1956 that was particularly pronounced among male workers was 
the increase in the already high number of alcoholics and in alcohol 
related domestic violence as a consequence. 151 
It was in a climate dominated by withdrawal and distrust of the 
government, that the Kádár government offered tangible material 
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improvements – improvements that met working-class hunger for 
better economic circumstances for their own households; something 
which had lain behind the anger that stimulated working-class 
mobilization during the Revolution. By the end of 1957 as a result of 
wage increases the average income of a working family in Budapest 
was 18 percent higher than it had been a year previously. 152 In Újpest 
in 1958 there was much greater satisfaction with wage rates than there 
had been several years earlier, though workers felt that not all problems 
with wages had been solved. 153 In the Zalaegerszeg Clothing Factory 
Kádár's policies had a similar effect;  in 1952 the average wage of 
workers in the factory had stood at 703 Forints per month, by 1957 the 
average wage level had risen to 1,147 Forints per month. The problems 
of the wage system for the workers on the production line changed 
little. Though the intensity of work was reduced, and the situation with 
raw material provision improved, as wages were raised many of the 
problems of the wage systems remained. 154 The visible improvements 
in living standards had led to the development of a degree of trust 
between the government and industrial workers by early 1958 in 
Budapest, as in other working-class areas. 155 
 
It would be a mistake to overestimate this degree of trust, however. The 
memory of the 1956 Revolution was never far below the surface in 
1958. Many workers attributed their improved financial situation as 
due in a large part to the 1956 Revolution. Workers, furthermore, 
remained to some extent distrustful and were uncertain as to what 
extent the increases in living standards were a kind of temporary phase 
before the wage increases were withdrawn and the state reverted to 
Stalinism. In Újpest "the influence of old, bad experiences still has a 
big impact on people, fluctuations in earnings, even the slightest falls 
in wages that are pretty frequent cause disquiet, discontent and distrust 
among the workers". 156 The reconstruction of socialism after 1956 and 
its limits in Hungary’s industrial communities bore the imprint of both 
socialism’s decay and its outright collapse in those areas before and 
during the 1956 Revolution. Though in the short and medium-term this 
reconstruction paved the way for the consolidation of socialist rule in 
Hungary, its ambiguous nature would come back to haunt the regime 
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during its eventual and final collapse in the 1980s. 
 
                                                 
1
 - “A bányászok nehéz munkájukhoz méltó bért kapnak”, Komárom 
Megyei Hírlap (27th November, 1956), p.1 
2
 - Országos Szechényi Könyvtár, Kézirattár (National Szechényi 
Library, Manuscripts Collection, hereafter OSZK Kt.), 1956-os 
gyűtemény, Komárom-Esztergom megye (1956 Collections, Komárom-
Esztergom county, hereafter 412.VIIf)., 7d. – Tatabánya Városi Tanács 
VB. Tárgy: Az 1956.okt.23.-i és követő ellenforradalmi események 
leirása. Hiv.rsz: T.260/1957.; on the strike and its impact see OSZK Kt. 
412.VIIf.6d. – Komárom Megyei Tanács VB 1957; Beszámoló az 1957 
május hó 16-i tanácsülésre, a végrehajtóbizottság  munkájáról, pp.2-3; 
on the nature of the strike in the mining enterprises see OSZK Kt. 
412.VIIf.1d. – Komárom Megyei Biróság, Elnökségi iratok 1958; Az 
Esztergomi Megyei Biróság Elnökétől. Esztergom, Kossuth Lajos 
u.6.I.em.Tel:212. 1958.El.IX.22.szám. Tárgy: 1958. évi április havi 
jelentés, pp.1-3 
3
 - “Tatabánya, 1956. december 11. 13 óra 27 perc. Komárom megyei 
rendőrkapitány jelentése”, in Erzsébet Kajári, (ed.) Rendőrségi Napi 
Jelentések: 1956. október 23. – December 12. Első kötet, (Budapest: 
Az 1956-os Intézet, 1996), pp.478-9 
4
 - “Kik és miért félnek a tatabányai karhatalomtól?”, Komárom Megyei 
Hírlap (22nd December, 1956), p.3 
5
 - For the official presentation of the events of 1956 and how they 
were represented in official propaganda see the five volumes of the so-
called “white book”, Ellenforradalmi erők a magyar októberi 
eseményekben. I-1V kötet, (Budapest: A Magyar Népköztársaság 
Minisztertanácsa Tájékoztatási Hivatala – Zrinyi Nyomda, 1957), and 
Nagy Imre és bűntársai ellenforradalmi összesküvése, (Budapest: A 
Magyar Népköztársaság Minisztertanácsa Tájékoztatási Hivatala – 
Zrinyi Nyomda, 1958) 
6
 - For representations of the local “myth” of the “counter-revolution” 
in propaganda, see Az ellenforradalom Komárom megyei eseményeiből, 
(Tatabánya: MSZMP Komárom megyei Intézőbizottsága, 1957); see 
the series of articles in the county party newspaper – the first of which 
35 
 
                                                                                                                
was “Hogyan Történt? Az ellenforradalom tatabányai napjaiból”, 
Komárom Megyei Hírlap (26th January, 1957), p.4; on how the 
particular local construction of this “myth” shaped the post-
revolutionary political trials see the indictments and/or verdicts in the 
two most important of the political trials that concerned the events in 
the city – OSZK Kt., 1956-os gyűjtemény, Győri Megyei Biróság 
Népbirósági Tanácsanak anyaga (1956 Collection, Material of the Győr 
Peoples’ Court, hereafter 1956-os gy., Gy.NB.) 1127/1957, 1d.; Győr 
Sopronmegyei Ügyészség, Győr. 1957.Bül.372 szám. Vádirat népi 
demokratikus államrend megdöntésére irányuló szervezkedés 
vezetésének büntette miatt dr. Klébert Márton és társai ellen inditott 
bünügyben; OSZK Kt. 412.VIIf.4d. – Győri Népbiróság 
B.0027/1957/16 – Mazalin György és társai; A Magyar Népköztársaság 
Legfelsőbb Birósága népbirósági tanácsa. Nbf.I.5198/1958/31.szám 
7
 - “Újra az Élen! Ismét elsők a tatabányai XI-es aknaiak”, Komárom 
Megyei Hírlap (26th January, 1957), p.3 
8
 - OSZK Kt.412.VIIf.2d.- Esztergom Megyei Biróság – 429/1957; 
B.429/1957/5 szám. Jegyzőkönyv készült a 
Nép.d.áll.rend.megdönt.ir.mozg.való részv.btte. miatt Kovács Imre és 
társai ellen inditott bűnügyben az Esztergomi Megyei Biróság 
Tatabány-án biróságnál 1957 évi szeptember hó 2 napján tartott zárt 
tárgyalásról, p.13 
9
 - “Ha nincs szén – veszélyben Tatabánya élelmiszerellátása”, 
Komárom Megyei Hírlap (15th December, 1956), p.1 
10
 - Komárom-Esztergom Megyei Önkormányzat Levéltára (Archive of 
the Government of Komárom-Esztergom County, hereafter KEMÖL), 
Az MSZMP Tatabánya Városi Bizottságának iratai (Papers of the 
Tatabánya City Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 
hereafter XXXV.2f.)3/1957/8ö.e., pp.7-15 
11
 - “A tatabányai bányászok válasza: a sztrajkra, a 
munkanélküliségre”, Komárom Megyei Hírlap (6th January, 1957), p.3 
12
 - KEMÖL XXXV.2f.2/2ö.e., p.28 
13
 - On wages see “A szakmány bérezésről”, Komárom Megyei Hírlap 
(6th January, 1957), p.2 
14
 - KEMÖL XXXV.2f.3/1958/17ö.e., p.2 
36 
 
                                                                                                                
15
 - KEMÖL Az MSZMP Komárom Megyei Bizottságának iratai 
(Papers of the Komárom County Committee of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party, hereafter XXXV.1f.)3/1957/23ö.e., pp.4-5 
16
 - The phrase is borrowed from Johanna Granville, The First Domino: 
International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956, 
foreword by Raymond L. Garthoff (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2004); See also Csaba Békés, (ed.) Az 1956-os 
magyar forradalom helye a szovjet kommunista rendszer 
összeomlásáben, (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1993), and Gregorz 
Ekiert, The State Against Society: Political Crises and their Aftermath 
in East Central Europe, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1996) 
17
 - János M. Rainer, “A rendszerváltás és ötvenhat”, in András Bozóki, 
(ed.), A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve: Kerekasztal-tárgyalások 1989-
ben. 7 kötet. Alkotmányos Forradalom. Tanulmányok, (Budapest: Új 
Mandátum, 2000), pp. 651-58  
18
 - There is a growing historical literature in Hungary on those patterns 
of governance – for two conflicting approaches which concentrate on 
different decades and draw different conclusion about Kádár’s regime 
see János M. Rainer, (ed.), “Hatvanas Évek” Magyarországon: 
Tanulmányok, (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2004), and Károly 
Szerencsés, & István Simon, (eds.), Azok a Kádári “Szép” Napok: 
Dokumentumok a hetvenes évek történetéből, (Budapest: Kairosz 
Kiadó, 2004). For studies and collections that concentrate on aspects of 
Kádár’s rule, see Tibor Huszár, (ed.), Kedves Jó Kádár Elvtárs! 
Válógatás Kádár János Levelezéséből, 1954-1989, (Budapest: Osiris, 
2002); Melinda Kalmár, Ennivaló és hozomány: A kora kádárizmus 
ideológia, (Budapest; Magvető, 1998); Zsuzsanna Varga, Politika, 
paraszti érdekérvényesítés és szövetkezetek Magyarországon, 1956-
1967, (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2001) 
19
 - This notion is adapted from the author’s introduction to János M. 
Rainer, Ötvenhat Után, (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2003) 
20
 - I make this case in Mark Pittaway, “The Politics of Legitimacy and 
Hungary’s Postwar Transition”, Contemporary European History, 13, 
4 (2004); 453-75 
37 
 
                                                                                                                
21
 - Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye Győri Levéltár (Győr Branch of the 
Győr-Moson-Sopron County Archive, hereafter Gy.MSM.Gy.L.), 
Győr-Moson megye és Győr thj. város főispánja 1945-1950, 
Általános iratok (Papers of the Lord-Lieutenant of Győr-Moson 
County and of the City of Győr 1945-1950, General Papers, 
hereafter XXIf.1b.) 1d.; Győr-Moson megye é s Győr thj. város 
főispánjától. 75/5.főisp.1945.sz. Tárgy: Szeptember havi tájékoztató 
jelentés, p.1 
22
 - Zala Megyei Levéltár (Zala County Archive, hereafter ZML), Az 
MDP Zala Megyei Bizottságának iratai (Papers of the Zala County 
Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, hereafter XXXV.57f.)1/ 
70 ö.e., pp.26-31 
23
 - GyMSMGy.L., Az MDP Győr-Moson-Sopron Megyei Bizottság, 
Mezőgazdasági Osztály iratai (Papers of the Agricultural Department 
of the Győr-Moson-Sopron County Committee of the Hungarian 
Workers’ Party, hereafter Xf.402/2/Mezőgazdaság)/8ö.e.; M.D.P. 
Járási Bizottság Mosonmagyaróvár, Sallai Imre ut 3 sz, Jelentés. 
Mosonmagyaróvár, 1950. augusztus 9-én., p.1 
24
 - For the actions of such radio stations and their interaction with 
domestic opinion, see Mark Pittaway, “The Education of Dissent: The 
Reception of the Voice of Free Hungary, 1951-6”, Cold War History, 
4, 1 (2003): 97-116 
25
 - See the documents in ZML, Az MSZMP Zala Megyei 
Bizottságának iratai (Papers of the Zala County Committee of the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, hereafter XXXV.1f.)1957/9ö.e. 
26
 - Fejér Megyei Levéltár (Fejér County Archive, hereafter FML), Az 
MSZMP Fejér Megyei Bizottságának iratai (Papers of the Fejér County 
Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, hereafter 
XXXV.19f.)/1957/14ö.e., p.59 
27
 - For a discussion of this phenomenon in general terms, which 
reveals parallels with the climate inside Hungary after 1956, see 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, 
Mourning, and Recovery, translated by Jefferson Chase, (Granta 
Books, London, 2003) 
28
 - Budapest Főváros Levéltára (Archives of the City of Budapest, 
38 
 
                                                                                                                
hereafter BFL), Az MSZMP Budapesti Bizottságának iratai (Papers 
of the Budapest Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party, hereafter XXXV.1f.)/app./1958/138ö.e., pp.289-95 
29
 - For the generation of this settlement in rural areas see Varga, 
Politika, paraszti érdekérvényesítés és szövetkezetek; the issue of the 
acceptance of the regime among conservative members of the middle 
class is addressed best in János M. Rainer, “Submerging or Clinging 
On Again? József Antall, Father and Son, in Hungary after 1956”, 
Contemporary European History, 14, 1 (2005): 65-105 
30
 - Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archive, hereafter 
MOL), A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt Központi Bizottságának 
iratai (Papers of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party, hereafter M-KS-288f.)21/1958/20ö.e., pp.252-3; MOL 
M-KS-288f.21/1958/23 ö.e., p.502; ZML XXXV.1f.1958/12 ö.e.; 
Feljegyzés a Zalaegerszegi Ruhagyár pártszervezetének agitációs 
munkájáról, pp.25-6; BFL XXXV.1f.1958/42ö.e., pp.49-52 
31
 - MOL M-KS-288f.5/23ö.e./1957.április 23., p.92 
32
 - MOL M-KS-288f.5/96ö.e., p.3 
33
 - For a good example of these cultural assumptions manifesting 
themselves in internal discussions see MOL M-KS-
288f.21/1958/20ö.e., pp.1-8 
34
 - I outline this argument in the following articles: Mark Pittaway, 
“Az állami ellenőrzés társadalmi korlátainak újraértékelése: az ipari 
dolgozók és a szocialista diktatúra Magyarországon, 1948-1953” in 
Sándor Horváth, László Pethő & Eszter Zsófia Tóth (eds.) 
Munkástörténet – Munkásantropológia, (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 
2003), pp. 71-82; Mark Pittaway, “The Reproduction of Hierarchy: 
Skill, Working-Class Culture and the State in Early Socialist Hungary”, 
The Journal of Modern History, 74, 4 (2002): 737-69; Mark Pittaway, 
“The Social Limits of State Control: Time, the Industrial Wage 
Relation and Social Identity in Stalinist Hungary, 1948-1953”, Journal 
of Historical Sociology, 12, 3 (1999): 271-301 
35
 - For the Plovdiv events see R.J. Crampton, A Short History of 
Modern Bulgaria, (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), p.176; on the revolt in Plzeñ the best available account is 
39 
 
                                                                                                                
still Otto Ulc "Pilsen: the unknown revolt", Problems of Communism, 
14, 3 (1965): 46-9; for a summary of the 1953 events in the GDR see 
Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-
1989, (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.177-
87. 
36
 - BFL, Az MDP Budapesti Bizottságának iratai (Papers of the 
Budapest Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, hereafter 
XXXV.95f.)2/215ö.e., pp.54-5 
37
 - For the political background the best account is provided in János 
M. Rainer, Nagy Imre: Politikai életrajz. Első kötet 1896-1953, 
(Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1996), pp.489-542 
38
 - For some examples see, Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár 
(Archive of Political History and the Trade Unions, hereafter PtSzL), A 
Szakszervezetek Országos Tanácsa iratai (Papers of the Central 
Council of Trade Unions, hereafter XII.2f.)7/33d./1953; Feljegyzés a 
kormányprogrammal kapcsolatos üzemi tapasztalatokról, p.1; ZML 
XXXV.57f.2/Agitprop/15 ö.e.; Jelentés Nagy Imre országgyűlési 
beszéde utáni megnyilvánulásokról,, p.1 
39
 - For some examples see “Fordítsunk nagyobb gondot a dolgozók 
kéréseire”, Futószalag (4th July, 1953), p.2; “Tűrhetetlen körülmények 
között dolgoznak a vigonyfonoda tépő dolgozói”, Pamut Újság (9th 
July, 1953), p.3 
40
 - Miklós Vásárhelyi, “Az első meghiúsított reformkisérlet”, 
Medvetánc, 2-3 (1988): 149-205 
41
 - Open Society Archives (OSA), Records of the Radio Free 
Europe Research Institute, Hungarian Unit (300-40); Item No. 
08699/53, p.1 
42
 - For an excellent insight into this “rearguard” action in anti-
communist western Hungary, see 
Gy.MSMGy.L.X.402f.2/Mezőgazdaság/20ö.e.; Magyar Dolgozók 
Pártja Sopron Járási Bizottsága, Magyar Dolgozók Pártja Megyei 
Pártbizottsága Mezőg.Osztály Bognár Elvtársnak, Sopron, 
1953.augusztus.11; for a useful account of official harassment of 
individual landholders, see OSA 300/40; Item No. 10105/54, pp.1-7 
40 
 
                                                                                                                
43
 - No reliable figures are available, but for an indication which is 
likely to understate the true effects of this phenomenon see MOL, A 
Magyar Dolgozók Pártja Központi Vezetőségének iratai (Papers of the 
Central Leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, hereafter M-KS-
276f.)65/251ö.e., p.147 
44
 -Gy.MSMGy.L.X.402f.2/Mezőgazdaság/24ö.e.; A Győri 
Textilmüvek patronálási csoport jelentése a páli “Sarló Kalapács” 
TSZCS-ben tett látogatásról, 1953.VII.7, p.1 
45
 - BFL XXXV.95f.2/215ö.e., p.139 
46
 - On the implementation of protective legislation in 1953, see Mark 
Pittaway, “Industrial Workers, Socialist Industrialisation and the State 
in Hungary, 1948-1958” (PhD thesis: University of Liverpool, 1998), 
p.276; MOL M-KS-276f.94/593ö.e., pp.1-4 
47
 - MOL M-KS-276f.94/827ö.e., pp.319-20 
48
 - OSA 300/40; Item No. 8083/54, p.12 
49 - PtSzL XII.2f.7/4d./1953; Jelentés a kormányprogramm utáni 
bérhelyzetről, p.4; PtSzL XII.2f.7/30d./1953; Levél az 
Élelmiszeripari Minsztérium Munkaügyi- és Bérfőosztály Vezetőtől 
a Szakszervezetek Országos Tanácsa Munkabér-osztálynak, 1953. 
október 8., p.4 
50
 - MOL M-KS-276f.94/743ö.e., pp.83-9 
51
 - For some of the specific wage measures aimed at the skilled and 
experienced, see PtSzL XII.2f.7/28d./1953; Minisztertanács 
Bértitkársága Javaslat az 1954. évben végrehajtandó bérügyi 
intézkedésekre 
52
 - MOL M-KS-276f.94/743ö.e., p.58 
53
 - PtSzL, Bányaipari Dolgozók Szakszervezetének iratai (Papers of 
Mineworkers’ Union, hereafter XII.30f.)745d./1954; Bányaipari 
Dolgozók Szakszervezete, Szénbányászati Tröszt Bizottság, Tatabánya. 
Jelentés Bányaipari Dolgozók Szakszervezeti szénbányászati tröszt 
bizottságának 1953.évi IV.negyedévi jelentése, p.4 
54
 - See the documents in BFL XXXV.95f.4/62ö.e. 
55
 - FML, Az MDP Dunai Vasmű építkezés és 
Dunapentele/Sztálinváros/ Városi Bizottságának iratai (Paper of the 
Danube Steel Works’ Construction Site and Dunapentele/Sztálinváros 
41 
 
                                                                                                                
City Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, hereafter 
17f.)2/PTO/22ö.e.; Kivonat II. A K.V. márciusi határozatával 
kapcsolatos hangulatról beszámoló, pp.5-7; BFL XXXV.95f.2/215ö.e., 
p.139 
56
 - Gy.MSMGy.L., Az MDP Győr Városi Bizottságának iratai (Papers 
of the Győr City Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, hereafter 
X.405f.)5/117ö.e.; Jegyzőkönyv felvétetett 1956. augusztus 21-én az 
Öntőde és Kovácsológyárban megtartott Párt-Csucsbizottsági 
értekezletén, pp.2-3 
57
 - MOL M-KS-276f.94/829ö.e., pp.90-2 
58
 - PtSzL XII.30f.922d./1955; Jelentés a bérezés egyszerüsitésének, és 
összevonásának levitele, annak eredményei és hibai 
59
 - This is clear from the article “Teljesíthetők-e bányaüzemeinkben a 
normák?”, Harc a Szénért: Tatabánya Város Pártbizottságának Lapja, 
(4th November, 1956), p.3 
60
 - BFL, Az MDP Budapest IV. Kerületi Bizottságának iratai 
(Papers of the Budapest IVth District Committee of the Hungarian 
Workers’ Party, hereafter XXXV.176f).2/158ö.e., p.32 
61
 - FML XXXV.17f.2/8ö.e.; A rendikivüli taggyűlésen felvetett 
kérdések, pp.1-10 
62
 - BFL XXXV.176f.2/154ö.e., p.275 
63
 - BFL XXXV.176f.2/154ö.e., p.188 
64
 - BFL XXXV.176f.2/154ö.e., p.274 
65
 - MOL M-KS-276f.66/23ö.e., pp.42-3 
66
 - MOL M-KS-276f.66/23ö.e., p.63 
67
 - BFL XXXV.176f.2/149ö.e., p.216; BFL XXXV.176f.2/149ö.e., 
pp.7-8 
68
 - BFL XXXV.176f.2/147ö.e., p.16 
69
 - ZML, Az MDP Letenye Járási Bizottságának iratai (Papers of the 
Letenye District Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, hereafter 
XXXV.61f.)1/42ö.e.; Lovászi üzem helyzetéről feljegyzések és 
tájékoztató, pp.1-2; ZML XXXV.61f.1/42ö.e.; Nagyaktiva ülésen 
készült feljegyzések, p.1 
70
 - BFL XXXV.176f.2/149ö.e., p.4 
42 
 
                                                                                                                
71
 - “Régi harcos szemmel látom”, Futószalag (22nd September, 1956), 
p.3 
72
 - OSZK 412.VIIf.7d. – Komárom Megyei Tanács – Titkárság; Városi 
Tanács VB. Elnökétől, Oroszlány. 775/1957. Tárgy: Az ellenforradalmi 
események leirása, pp.1-2 
73
 - For some useful accounts of the Revolution in the east of the 
country, see Attila Szakolczai & László A. Varga (eds.), A vidék 
forradalma, 1956. I kötet, (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet – Budapest 
Főváros Levéltára, 2003)  
74
 - Tibor Filep, Debrecen, 1956: Forradalom, nemzeti ellenállás, 
megtorlás, (Debrecen: Csokonai Kiadó, 2000); István Gazdag (ed.), 
1956 Dokumentumai Hajdú-Biharban: Az 1956-os forradalom Hajdú-
Bihar megyei történetének válogatott dokumentumai (Debrecen: Az 
1956-os Intézet Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Kutató-Csoportja, 1993), pp.29-
49; Attila Szakolczai, “Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén megye”, in Szakolczai 
& Varga (eds.), A vidék forradalma, 1956., pp. 121-35; Csaba Farkas, 
“Csongrád megye”, in ibid., pp. 201-32 
75
 - For the former, see János M. Rainer, “Helyi Politikai Szerveződés 
1956-ban – Az Újpesti Példa”, in Zsuzsanna Bencsík, & Gábor 
Kresalek, (eds.), Az Ostromtól a Forradalomig: adalékok Budapest 
múltjáról, (Budapest: Budapest Főváros Levéltára, 1990), pp. 101-112; 
for the latter see KEMÖL, XXXV.2f.3/1958/23ö.e., pp.4-9 
76
 - For two provincial examples, see Erzsébet Csomor, 1956 
Zalaegerszegen (Zalaegerszeg: Millecentenárium Közalapítvány, 
2001), pp. 25-33; “Győr-Sopron megyei Ügyészség, 1957 Tük. 0019 
szám. Feljegyzés”, in József Bana, (ed.) Győr 1956 III. Munkástanács-
vezetők per a Győri Megyei Biróság előtt, 1957-1958, (Győr: Győr 
Megyei Jogú Város Önkormányzata, 2002), pp. 5-6 
77
 - For one example from Nagykanizsa, see ZML, Az 1956-os Magyar 
Forradalom és Szabadságharc gyűjtemény (1956 Revolution and 
Struggle for Freedom Collection, hereafter XXXII.15f.)1d.; Zalamegyei 
Ügyészség Zalaegerszeg. 1957. Bül.59/3 szám. Izgatás büntette miatt 
Gáti József nagykanizsai lakos elleni bünügyben a nyomzati iratokat az 
alább vádirat benyujtásával teszem át., pp.1-2 
43 
 
                                                                                                                
78
 - See, Frigyes Kahler et al. (eds.), Sortűzek 1956, 2nd ed. (Budapest & 
Lakitelek: Igazságügyi Minisztérium – Antológia Kiadó, 1993) 
79
 - An excellent example of the confused ways in which revolutionary 
councils were elected and the way in which they reflected the 
preferences of the crowd is provided by events in Tatabánya, see OSZK 
Kt. 1956-os Gy., Gy.NB.1127/1957, 1d.; Győri megyei biróság 
népbirósági tanácsa. Nb.1122/1957.3.sz. Jegyzőkönyv készült a népi 
demokratikus államrend megdöntésére irányuló szervezkedés 
vezetésének büntette miatt Dr Klébert Márton és társa ellen inditott 
bünügyben a győri megyei biróság népbirósági tanácsa előtt 1957. 
október 26-napján megtartott nyilvános tárgyalásról, pp.2-3 
80
 - Csomor, 1956 Zalaegerszegen, pp.25-8 
81
 - Adapted from “Halottak – Mosonmagyaróvár Anyakönyvi 
Hivatal”, reprinted in Kahler et al. (eds.), Sortűzek 1956, pp.61-66 
82
 - Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom Történetének Dokumentációs és 
Kutatóintézete, Oral History Archívium (Oral History Archive of the 
1956 Institute, hereafore 1956-os Intézet, OHA) 449, p.5 
83
 - For some of these see Sándor Horváth, A kapu és a határ: 
mindennapi Sztálinváros, (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi 
Intézete, 2004), pp. 172-85 
84
 - OSZK Kt., 1956-os Gy. Budapest Fővárosi Biróság Népbirósági 
Tanácsanak anyaga, Kósa Pál és társai (Peoples’ Court Council of the 
Budapest City Court, Pál Kósa and associates, hereafter Bp.NB. 
4491/74), 3d./4; Budapest Rendőrfőkapitányság Politikai Nyomozó 
Osztály, Vizsgálati Osztály. Jegyzőkönyv Kollár József kihallgatásáról. 
Budapest, 1957. augusztus 1, p.1 
85
 - “Hogyan történt? Az ellenforradalom tatabányai napjaiból”, 
Komárom Megyei Hírlap, (26th January, 1957), p.4 
86
 - ZML, XXXII.15f.1d./B.322/1957; Zalamegyei Ügyészség 
Zalaegerszeg. 1957. Bül.59/3 szám. Izgatás büntette miatt Gáti József 
nagykanizsai lakos elleni bünügyben a nyomzati iratokat az alább 
vádirat benyujtásával teszem át., p.1 
87
 - OSZK Kt., 1956-os Gy. Bp.NB. 4491/74, 3d./8; Budapest Fővárosi 
Biróság Népbirósági Tanácsa NB.II.8017/1958. LXXXVIII 
Jegyzőkönyv készült a szervezkedés és egyéb büncselekmények miatt 
44 
 
                                                                                                                
Kósa Pál és 32 társa elleninditott büntető ügyben a Budapesti Fővárosi 
Biróság  Népbirósági Tanácsánál 1959. február 9-én megtartott zárt 
tárgyalásról, p.3 
88
 - 1956-os Intézet, OHA 417, p.17; OSZK Kt.412.VIIf.1d.-Komárom 
Megyei Biróság-Elnökségi iratok 1958; Az Esztergom Megyei Biróság 
Elnökétől, Esztergom, Kossuth Lajos u.5.sz.Tel:212. 
1958.El.IX.B.27.sz. Tárgy: 1958.évi május havi jelentés, pp.2-3 
89
 - 1956-os Intézet, OHA 449, p.9 
90
 - BFL, Az MSZMP Budapest IV. Kerületi Bizottságának iratai 
(Papers of the Budapest IV District Committee of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party, hereafter XXXV.9f.)1957/15ö.e., p.102; 
OSZK Kt. 1956-os gy., Bp.NB. 4491/74, 1d./8; 
Bp.Főkap.Pol.Nyom.Osztály Vizsg.alo.57 nov 6, Bp., pp.1-2  
91
 - OSZK Kt., 1956-os Gy. Bp.NB. 4491/74, 1d./6; Budapesti 
Rendőrfőkapitányság Politikai Nyomozó Osztály, Vizsgálati Alosztály. 
Jegyzőkönyv Lészai/Lothringer/Béla őrizetes kihallgatásáról. Budapest, 
1957. augusztus 23., p.1 
92
 - These are reprinted as “The “Sixteen Points” Prepared by 
Hungarian Students, October 22-23, 1956”, in Csaba Békés, Malcom 
Byrne & János M. Rainer, (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A 
History in Documents, (Budapest & New York: Central European 
University Press, 2002), pp. 188-90 
93
 - BFL, XXXV.9f.1957/15ö.e., p.102 
94
 - OSZK Kt., 1956-os Gy. Bp.NB. 4491/74, 1d./6; Budapesti 
Rendőrfőkapitányság Politikai Nyomozó Osztály, Vizsgálati Alosztály. 
Jegyzőkönyv Lészai/Lothringer/Béla őrizetes kihallgatásáról. Budapest, 
1957. augusztus 23., p.1 
95
 - BFL, XXXV.9f.1957/15ö.e., p.102 
96
 - OSZK Kt., 1956-os Gy., Bp.NB. 4491/74, 2d./6; Budapesti 
Rendőrfőkapitányság Politikai Nyomozó Osztály VI/7 csop. 
Jegyzőkönyv Bpest, 1957.VI.24. Tóth Gábor gyanusitott 
kihallgatásáról, p.2 
97
 - OSZK Kt., 1956-os Gy., Bp.NB. 4491/74, 2d./3; A Budapesti 
Fővárosi Biróság Népbirósági Tanácsa. T.NB.8017/1958/III 
Jegyzőkönyv készült a szervezkedés és egyéb büncselekmények miatt 
45 
 
                                                                                                                
Kósa Pál és 32 társa elleninditott büntető ügyben a Budapesti Fővárosi 
Biróság  Népbirósági Tanácsánál 1958. április 30-án megtartott zárt 
tárgyalásról, p.4  
98
 - ZML, XXXII.15f.3d./B.695/1958; Zalamegyei Ügyészség 
Zalaegerszeg. B.10.050/1958/3 szám. Megyei Biróságnak, 
Zalaegerszeg. A népi demokratikus államrend megdöntésére irányuló 
szervezkedés büntette miatt Villányi József pilisszentlászlói lakos és 
társai ellen inditott bünügyben a keletkezett nyomzati iratokat a 
következő vádirat kiséretében teszem át, pp.1-2 
99
 - “Éjszakai jelentések Kanizáról”, reprinted in, Erzsébet Csomor & 
Imre Kapiller, (eds.), ’56 Zalaban: A forradalom eseményeinek Zala 
megyei dokumentumai 1956-1958, (Zalaegerszeg: Zalai Gyűjtemény 
40, 1996), p.56 
100
 - OSZK Kt. 1956-os Gy., Gy.NB.1127/1957, 1d.; Győr 
Sopronmegyei Ügyészség, Győr, 1957. Bül. 372 szám. Vádirat népi 
demokratikus államrend megdöntésére irányuló szervezkedés 
vezetésének büntette miatt dr. Klébert Márton és társai ellen inditott 
bünügyben, pp.1-2 
101
 - OSZK Kt. 412/VIIf.2d.-Esztergom Megyei Biróság-429/1957-
Kovács Imre és társai; B.429/1957/5 szám. Jegyzőkönyv készült a 
Nép.d.áll.rend.megdönt.ir.mozg.való részv.btte. miatt Kovács Imre és 
társai ellen inditott bűnügyben az Esztergomi Megyei Biróság 
Tatabány-án biróságnál 1957 szeptember hó 2 napján tartott zárt 
tárgyalásról, p.3 
102
 - BFL, XXXV.9f.1957/15ö.e., p.102 
103
 - Pittaway, “Industrial Workers, Socialist Industrialisation and the 
State in Hungary”, pp.347-8 
104
 - PtSzL, Az 1956-os gyűjtemény (1956 Collection, hereafter 
IX.290f.)37ö.e., p.57 
105
 - For the deeds of the worker's council in its first three days of 
operation see Dobricia Cosic, 7 nap Budapesten 1956. október 23-30, 
(Budapest: Bethlen Gábor Könyvkiadó, 1989), pp. 80-2; Bill Lomax, 
(ed.), Worker's Councils in 1956, translated by Bill Lomax & Julian 
Schöpflin, (New York: Columbia University Press, New York 1990), 
pp.15-7 
46 
 
                                                                                                                
106
 - PtSzL, IX.290f.39ö.e., pp.1-2 
107
 - “The Workers Council of the Ganz Wagon and Machine Factory”, 
in Lomax, (ed.),  Worker's Councils in 1956, p.51 
108
 - PtSzL, IX.290f.37ö.e., p.95&p.107 
109
 - OSZK Kt. 1956-os Gy., Bp.NB.4491/74,3d./8; Budapesti Fővárosi 
Biróság Népbirósági Tanácsa NB.II.8017/1958.szám. L. Jegyzőkönyv 
készült a szervezkedés és egyéb büncselekmények miatt Kósa Pál és 29 
társa elleninditott büntető ügyben a Budapesti Fővárosi Biróság  
Népbirósági Tanácsánál 1958. október 13-án megtartott zárt 
tárgyalásról, p.11 
110
 - OSZK Kt., 1956-os Gy., Bp.NB.4491/74,2d./6; B.M. Budapesti 
Rendőrfőkapitányság Pol.Nyom.Oszt.Vizsg.Alosztálya. Jegyzőkönyv 
Sohonyai János gyanusitott kihallgatásáról. Budapest, 1957. augusztus 
15-én, p.4 
111
 - OSZK Kt. 1956-os Gy., Bp.NB.4491/74,3d./5; Budapesti 
Rendőrfőkapitányság Politikai Nyomozó Alosztály Vizsgálati 
Alosztály. Jegyzőkönyv, Budapest, 1957. junius 10-én, p.3 
112
 - PtSzL, IX.290f./52ö.e., pp.5-20 
113
 - ZML, XXXII.15f.2d./B.833/1957; A zalaegerszegi megyei biróság. 
B.833/1957.6.szám. Jegyzőkönyv készült a népi demokratikus 
államrend megdöntésére irányuló szervezkedés és egyéb bűntette miatt 
Mecséri József ellen inditott bűnügyben a zalaegerszegi megyei 
biróságnál Zalaegerszegen 1958 január 14-én megtartott nyilvános 
tárgyalásról, pp.1-6 
114
 - Columbia University Libraries, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, 
Bakhmeteff Archive (hereafter CUL RB&ML, BAR), Hungarian 
Refugees Project (hereafter CURPH), Box 16., Interview No. 524, pp. 
5-6 
115
 - OSZK Kt., 412/VIIf.7d.-Komárom Megyei Tanács, Titkárság; 
Várgesztes községi Tanács V.B. Az 1956. évi október 23.-utáni 
események megörökitése, pp.1-7 
116
 - ZML, XXXII.15f.2d./B.781/1957; Zalamegyei Ügyészség 
Zalaegerszeg. 1957.Bül.189.szám. Vádirat. Népidemokratikus 
államrend megdöntésére irányuló büntette miatt Papp Imre és társai 
ellen inditott bünügyben, pp.3-4 
47 
 
                                                                                                                
117
 - OSZK Kt., 412/VIIf.7d.- Komárom Megyei Tanács, Titkárság; 
Vértesszöllős községi tanács V.B.től. 572/1957.szám. Tárgy: 
1957.október 23-I és azt követő ellenforradalmi cselekmény leirása, p.1 
118
 - ZML, XXXII.15f.2d./B.1003/1957; A zalaegerszegi megyei 
biróság. B.1003/1957-6.szám. A Népköztársaság Névében! A 
zalaegerszegi megyei biróság Zalaegerszegen 1958. január 28 és 29 
napján nem nyilvánosan megtartott tagyaláson meghozta a következő 
itéletet, p.5  
119
 - ZML, XXXII.15f.2d./B.780/1957; A zalaegerszegi megyei biróság. 
B.780/1957/6.szám. A Népköztársaság Névében! A zalaegerszegi 
megyei biróság Nagykanizsán 1957. november 11-19-én megtartott 
nyilvános tagyalás alapján meghozta a következő itéletet, p.7 
120
 - OSZK Kt., 412.VIIf.2d.-Esztergom Megyei Biróság-429/1957-
Kovács Imre és társai; B.429/1957/5 szám. Jegyzőkönyv készült a 
Nép.d.áll.rend.megdönt.ir.mozg.való részv.btte miatt Kovács Imre és 
társai ellen inditott bűnügyben a Esztergomi Megyei Biróság Tatabány-
án biróságnál 1957 évi szeptember hó 2 napján tartott zárt tárgyalásról, 
p.3 
121
 - MOL M-KS-288f.21/1958/22ö.e., p.241 
122
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1958/46ö.e., p.44 
123
 - 1956-os Intézet, OHA 484, p.44 
124
 - 1956-os Intézet, OHA 449, p.21 
125
 - László Eörsi Ferencváros 1956: A kerület fegyveres csoportjai, 
(Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1997); László Eörsi A Tűzoltó Utcai 
Fegyveres Csoport a Forradalomban, (Budapest: Századvég Kiadó-
1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1993); László Eörsi, Corvinisták 1956: A 
VIII kerület fegyveres csoportjai, (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2001)  
126
 - Tibor Drucker "A felszabadult Csepel", in, Jenő Adamovits et al., 
(eds.), Csepel Története, (Budapest: Csepel Vas- és Fémművek 
Pártbizottsága, 1965), pp. 476-7  
127
 - András B. Hegedüs et al. (ed.) 1956 Kézikönyve. Megtorlás és 
Emlékezés, (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1996), pp. 303-5 
128
 - OSZK Kt. 1956-os Gy., Gy.NB.1127/1957,2d.; B.M. Komárom 
megyei Rendőrfőkapitányság Politikai Osztály, Vizsgálati Alosztály, 
48 
 
                                                                                                                
Jegyzőkönyv, dr. Klebert Márton kihallgatásáról. Tatabánya, 
1957.aug.3, pp.2-3 
129
 - FML, Az MSZMP Dunaújvárosi Bizottságának iratai (Papers of 
the Dunaújváros City Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party, hereafter XXXV.22f.)1957/4/a ö.e.; Október 23-tól November 7-
ig, p.41 
130
 - PtSzL, IX.290f./38ö.e., pp.10-2 
131
 - BFL, XXXV.9f.1957/15ö.e., p.104 
132
 - PtSzL, IX.290f./31ö.e., p.5 
133
 - “The First Decree of the Kádár Government concerning the 
Workers’ Councils”, Lomax, (ed.),  Worker's Councils in 1956, p.97 
134
 - Rainer, “Helyi Politikai Szerveződés 1956-ban”, pp.107 
135
 - PtSzL, IX.290f./31ö.e., pp.5-8; Balázs Nagy "Budapest 1956: The 
Central Workers' Council", in Lomax (ed.), Eyewitness in Hungary, 
(Nottingham: Spokesman, 1980), pp.165-81; and those of Miklós 
Sebestyén, Ferenc Tőke and Sándor Rácz reprinted in István Kemény 
& Bill Lomax (eds.) Magyar munkástanácsok 1956-ban, (Paris: 
Magyar Füzetek, 1986), pp.160-7, pp.167-89 & pp.217-39 
136
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1957/29ö.e., pp.24-6; PtSzL, IX.290f./31ö.e., 
pp.138-43 
137
 - PtSzL, IX.290f./31ö.e., pp.172-84 
138
 - For the final elimination of the Greater Budapest Central Workers' 
Council see Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956, (London: Allison & Busby, 
1976), pp.165-9; BFL, XXXV.1f.1957/29ö.e., pp.24-85 
139
 - Kajári (ed.) Rendőrségi Napi Jelentések.Első kötet, pp.383-4, 415, 
432, 467, 478-9, 505; MOL M-KS-288f.25/1957/7ö.e., p.135 
140
 - FML, XXXV.19f.1957/14ö.e.; B.M. Fejérmegyei 
Rendőrfőkápitányság Politikai Nyomozó Főosztálya Feljegyzés, p.2; 
MOL M-KS-288f.25/1957/7ö.e., p.75; MOL M-KS-
288f.25/1957/8ö.e., p.152; Lomax, Hungary 1956, pp.168-9 
141
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1957/42ö.e., p.121 
142
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1956-7/41ö.e., p.160; BFL, XXXV.1f.1956-
7/41ö.e., p.170; BFL, XXXV.1f.1956-7/41ö.e., p.23 
143
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1957/43ö.e., pp.16-7 
49 
 
                                                                                                                
144
 - FML, Az MSZMP Fejér Megyei Bizottságának iratai (Papers of 
the Fejér County Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 
hereafter XXXV.9f.)/1957/14ö.e.; B.M. Fejérmegyei 
Rendőrfőkapitányság Politikai Nyomozó osztálya, p.2 
145
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1957/45ö.e., p.243 
146
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1957/46ö.e., p.46 
147
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1958/41ö.e., pp.28-9 
148
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1958/134ö.e., p.372 
149
 - ZML, XXXV.1f.1958/12 ö.e.; A tapasztalatok összefoglalása, p.12 
150
 - ZML, XXXV.1f.1958/12 ö.e.; Feljegyzés a Zalaegerszegi 
Ruhagyár pártszervezetének agitációs munkájáról, pp.5-6 
151
- BFL, XXXV.1f.1958/134ö.e., p.29 
152
 - MOL M-KS-288f.23/1957/34ö.e., p.34 
153
 - MOL M-KS-288f.21/1958/20ö.e., pp.252-3 
154
 - ZML, XXXV. 1f.1958/12 ö.e.; Feljegyzés a Zalaegerszegi 
Ruhagyár pártszervezetének agitációs munkájáról, pp.25-6 
155
 - BFL, XXXV.1f.1958/42ö.e., pp.49-52 
156
 - MOL M-KS-288f.21/1958/20ö.e., p.250 
